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Governmental organizations are currently developing standards for civil unmannedaircraft to operate safely in the
national airspace. A key requirement for aircraft certification is reliability assessment. Traditional reliability
assessment methods make assumptions that are overly restrictive when applied to unmanned aircraft. This paper
presents a step-by-step, model-based, reliability assessment method that is tailored for unmanned aircraft. In
particular, this paper investigates the effects of stuck actuator faults (a common failure mode in electromechanical
actuators) on the overall reliability. Several candidate actuator architectures, with different numbers of controllable
surfaces, are compared to gain insight into the effect of actuator placement on reliability. It is assumed that a fault
detection algorithm is available and affected by known rates of false alarms and missed detections. The overall
reliability is shown to be dependent on several parameters, including hardware quality, fault detection performance,
mission profile, flight envelope, and operating point. In addition to being an analysis tool, the method can help
understand aircraft design tradeoffs.
I. Introduction
T HE small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry isundergoing a rapid transformation due to the emergence of
several commercial applications, such as law enforcement, search
and rescue, and precision agriculture [1]. The commercial UAV
market is projected to surpass the military market in the coming
years [2]. Despite these economic indicators, widespread commercial
use of UAVs is still several years away. A barrier for UAV
commercialization is their (current) inability to safely and reliably
access common airspace. This is due to a combination of regulatory
and technical challenges. On the regulatory side, significant work is
currently underway, both in the United States and in the European
Union, to establish a long-term framework for the seamless
integration of UAVs into their respective national airspaces [3–5].
Some researchers have proposed basing the certification require-
ments on the type and ownership of the property being overflown [6].
On the technical side, challenges such as sense-and-avoid
capabilities, secure communication, human factors, and reliability
need to be addressed [7].
To understand the challenges of integrating UAVs into the national
airspace, consider the current safety standards set by the Federal
AviationAdministration formanned commercial aircraft. In order for
amanned commercial aircraft to be certified, there should be nomore
than one catastrophic failure per billion hours of flight operation.
Airframe manufacturers, such as Boeing, meet the 10−9 failures per
flight hour standard by using traditional hardware redundancy
(multiple analogous components) in their designs [8,9]. On the other
hand, most civil UAVs have reliabilities that are orders of magnitude
worse than the 10−9 level [10]. As an example, consider the Sentera
Vireo ¶ pictured in Fig. 1.Most components on the Vireo are low-cost
and low-reliability.
Traditional hardware redundancy is not economical for small
UAVs because they have stringent size, weight, and power (SWAP)
constraints [11]. Alternatively, cross-functional hardware redun-
dancy (components that perform two ormore functions) is a judicious
solution. As an example, consider ailerons that are no longer
constrained to deflect antisymmetrically. Removing this constraint
effectively turns ailerons into elevons. Elevons are cross-functional
because they can provide both pitch and roll control authorities. Thus,
given a limited design space, it is beneficial in some cases to replace
traditional control surfaces with cross-functional ones.
Increasing the reliability of UAVs is just one side of the story; these
increases need to be quantified to prove compliance with certification
standards. The aerospace industry has traditionally relied on methods
such as fault tree analysis as well as failure modes and effects analysis
for reliability quantification [12,13]. These traditional reliability
analysis methods are used to prove compliance with the Federal
Aviation Regulations, European Aviation Safety Agency Regulations,
etc. In particular, theymodel the effect of the fault as a binary process; a
fault, if present, will lead to a catastrophic failure. As a consequence,
they yield conservative results because there may be fault modes that
degradeperformance but donot necessarily lead to catastrophic failure.
This paper proposes a model-based reliability analysis method for
unmanned aircraft, wherein actuator faults are treated probabilistically.
In doing so, credit is given to the fact that some fault modes can be
tolerated with degraded performance but do not necessarily lead to
catastrophic failure.
Reliability quantification methods provide a critical feedback
loop to the aircraft designer. The system-level reliability of a UAV
can be decomposed into those of the individual subsystems using a
fault tree. Information about the reliability contributions of
individual subsystems can help aircraft designers make more
intelligent design tradeoffs. This research specifically considers the
reliability contribution of the actuator subsystem, consisting of the
aerodynamic control surfaces and the servomotors that drive them.
Of the plethora of fault modes that affect servomotors, the stuck
fault (one of the most common failure modes) is considered for
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illustrative purposes. The phrase actuator architecture is used to
describe the placement of control surfaces and how they are
connected to the servomotors. The actuator architecture of an
aircraft affects its flight envelope, which, in turn, affects its system-
level reliability. Using the proposed reliability analysis method,
different UAV actuator architectures are compared in a case study.
The candidate architectures are different in the extent to which they
exploit cross-functionality in the aerodynamic control surfaces. To
comply with the aforementioned SWAP constraints, this paper
places an upper limit on the number of actuators.
The reliability assessment framework and the case study were
originally reported in [14], wherein the effects of two parameters
(servo reliability and missed detection rate) were investigated. This
paper advances the results of [14] in three main areas: 1) model
fidelity, 2) mission profile, and 3) trim point of the aircraft. First,
although a high-fidelity aircraft model was used in [14], this paper
demonstrates that a lower-fidelity model can equivalently be used in
the analysis without significant differences in the reliability
estimates. Second, in addition to the lawnmower mission profile (for
geographical surveying) presented in [14], this paper demonstrates
how the system-level reliability is related to the mission being flown.
Third, this paper demonstrates the effect of the operating/trim point on
the system-level reliability. The second and third points demonstrate
that the reliability of a UAV is dependent not only on its hardware
quality but also on its operating conditions. The new ideas presented
in this paper, although demonstrated using the actuator subsystem,
have broader applicability to aircraft reliability assessment.
II. Problem Formulation
A. Overview
The reliability of an aircraft is typically quantified by the
probability of catastrophic failure. For the work presented in this
paper, catastrophic failure is defined as loss of aircraft (LOA). LOA
results when the UAV is unable to reach a safe landing site due to
irrecoverable loss of control. In this paper, a safe landing site is any
site designated before takeoff where conditions allow for an aircraft
to landwithout additional damage. Catastrophic failures have several
causes, such as actuator failure, sensor failure, structural damage,
weather-related phenomena, etc. Because this paper specifically
considers the reliability of the actuator subsystem, actuator faults are
the primary failure modes of interest. Actuators contain many
moving parts and are among the least reliable components on a UAV.
Because actuators are connected to aerodynamic control surfaces,
actuator faults directly affect the flight dynamics of the UAV.
Actuator failures can lead to significant loss in controllability of the
aircraft and, eventually, catastrophic failure. It is possible, in some
cases, to adequately compensate for actuator failures by using other
actuators present on the aircraft.
Many small UAVs use hobby-grade servomotors, which have
failure times on the order of thousands of hours [15]. These servos
can fail in several different modes, such as bias, stuck, hard-over,
floating surface, oscillatory, and increased deadband or stiction
[16,17]. This paper will only focus on stuck actuator faults (including
stuck at the physical actuator limit) and analyze their impact on the
system-level reliability. In a stuck fault, the actuator gets jammed at
the value it was commanded before the failure. That said, the goal of
the paper is not to provide a comprehensive reliability assessment of
all possible failure modes of the actuator subsystem. Rather, it is to
provide a generic step-by-step procedure to conduct such a reliability
assessment and demonstrate the same using the stuck actuator fault
mode. The motor–propeller pair on a UAV can also be called an
actuator but is not considered in this paper. It is assumed that, under a
motor failure, the aircraft can glide to a safe landing site.
B. Airframe and Actuator Architecture
To complement the proposed reliability assessment method, this
paper applies the same to a case study involving a small UAV, named
Baldr, that is maintained and operated by the University of
Minnesota’s UAV Laboratories [18,19]. Baldr is based on the Ultra
Stick 120 airframe and is pictured in Figs. 2a and 2b. A high-fidelity
simulation environment was built for the Ultra Stick 120 using
Matlab/Simulink, with models for the various subsystems, such as
the aircraft dynamics, actuators, sensors, environmental effects, etc.
The rigid-body dynamics are implemented using the standard six-
degree-of-freedom, nonlinear aircraft equations of motion [20]. The
aerodynamic stability and control derivatives are identified from
wind-tunnel experiments conducted by NASA [21]. The nonlinear
aircraft model can be trimmed and linearized at any flight condition
within the flight envelope.
Baldr has a total of eight aerodynamic control surfaces, labeled in
Figs. 2a and 2b as flaps F1;2, ailerons A1;2, elevators E1;2, and
rudders R1;2. Each surface is independently actuated with the
following sign convention: a trailing-edge down deflection of the
elevators, ailerons, and flaps is considered positive; a trailing-edge
left deflection of the rudders, whenviewed top-downwith the aircraft
nose pointing forward, is considered positive. In addition, all the
surfaces have a deflection range of [−25,25 deg].
Fig. 1 The Sentera Vireo is an example small UAV.
Fig. 2 Baldr with labeled control surfaces (A: aileron, F: flap, E: elevator, R: rudder).
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The presence of eight aerodynamic control surfaces makes Baldr a
highly overactuatedUAV.On the other hand,most commercial fixed-
wing small UAVs are equipped with four or less control surfaces. To
draw conclusions on the reliabilities of typical small UAVs,
comparable actuator architectures need to be defined. This is
achieved by artificially constraining the actuators and control
surfaces of Baldr, as desired. To set up the case study, five actuator
architectures are defined in Table 1. The first column lists the name of
the configuration alongwith theminimumnumber of servos required
(given in parentheses). The next four columns list the constraints
placed on Baldr’s ailerons, elevators, rudders, and flaps, respectively.
The last column lists an acronym, where “C” is coupled, “D” is
decoupled, and “N” is none.
Configuration 0 is used exclusively for flight envelope assessment
and is not part of the case study, which compares configurations 1–4.
In selecting these four configurations, the design space is restricted
by limiting the total number of actuators to four. In terms of weight,
four is a reasonable number of actuators on a small UAV. These four
configurations are chosen because they are representative of the most
common actuator architectures. As an example, flaps are not very
common because they perform a very specific function and are not
used for the majority of the flight duration. Consequently,
configurations 1–4 do not have flaps. On the other hand, different
combinations of pitch and roll authorities are covered by elevators
and ailerons.
When all the actuators are healthy, a typical, nominal flight control
law is employed. As will be shown in the subsequent sections, the
nominal flight control law plays an important role in the analysis.
Many commercial UAVs operate with a classical flight control law,**
wherein the throttle and the elevators are used purely for longitudinal
control (pitch and airspeed), and the ailerons and the rudders are used
purely for lateral-directional control (roll and yaw) [19]. To maintain
compliancewith the state of practice and to simplify the analysis, it is
assumed that the same classical nominal flight control law is used
uniformly across configurations 1–4. This nominal flight control law
is designed to operate the ailerons antisymmetrically, to operate the
elevators and rudders symmetrically, and to hold the flaps at their zero
positions. In essence, when there are no actuator faults, there is
effectively only one closed-loop configuration. An alternative
approach would be to design individual flight control laws for each
configuration. However, because flight control laws can be designed
in several different ways, it would be difficult to compare the
reliabilities without a common baseline.
III. Reliability Analysis Method
The reliability analysis method presented here is a generic step-by-
step procedure that yields the probability of catastrophic failure of a
given airframe and actuator architecture. Several assumptions are
made to make the analysis tractable. First, it is assumed that a fault
detection and isolation (FDI) algorithm is available to detect actuator
faults. The FDI algorithm could either be built-in tests (self-
diagnostics within actuators) [22] or centralized monitoring systems
[23]. For simplicity, only statistical properties, such as missed
detection and false alarm rates, are considered. Second, it is assumed
that if the aircraft is trimmable after a fault has occurred then an
appropriate reconfigurable control law is available [24]. In other
words, transitions between trim points are without loss of control.
(A rigorous analysis of this problem requires reachability analysis
[24] but is not the focus of this paper.)
Third, it is assumed that multiple faults occur with negligible
probabilities. Hence, the reliability assessment conducted in this
paper only considers single actuator faults. Fourth, it is assumed that
the probability of an actuator getting stuck within a certain deflection
range is proportional to the probability of the actuator being
positioned within that range. Finally, this paper only considers the
undesirable consequences of LOA and not those of loss of mission
(LOM), wherein the mission is aborted but the aircraft is able to land
safely. LOM would need to be penalized to ensure that false alarms
are not frequently declared by the FDI algorithm. However, this is not
investigated in this paper because it is assumed that the FDI algorithm
has been properly designed.
First, it is useful to consider a bird’s-eye view of the entire analysis
method. The fault tree depicted in Fig. 3 provides such a top-down
perspective. The head of the fault tree is the final quantity of interest
(i.e., the probability of catastrophic failure PSYS). There are three
main levels below the head of the tree, each of which describes a
different type of contribution to the probability of catastrophic
failure. Each of these three levels is enclosed by a box and is labeled
by the type of contribution made: hardware faults, flight envelope
constraints, and FDI algorithm performance. The first contributor is
hardware faults, of which stuck servo failures are considered in this
paper. This level has two states: stuck servo failurewith probability q
and its complement 1 − q. The component-level reliability of many
aircraft servos are reported by the manufacturers using the metric of
mean time between failures (MTBF). Consequently, q is set equal to
1/MTBF. Moreover, it is assumed that all the servos on the aircraft
have the sameMTBF, which is time-invariant and independent of the
servomotor usage and position.
The structure of the fault tree depicted in Fig. 3 is affected by the
assumptions. For example, in the hardware level, the entire
probability of servo failure q is attributed to the stuck mode. This
excludes other failure modes, such as the hard-over, wherein an
electronic failure causes the actuators to stick at their extreme values.
Such hard-over failures can be included in the proposed analysis
method by adding additional branches within the hardware level of
the fault tree. Although the tree can bemade as exhaustive as desired,
the focus of this paper is on two new types of levels.
The next level considers the contributions made by the flight
envelope of the aircraft. This gives credit to the fact that some servo
failures are tolerable as long as the aircraft remains within its flight
envelope after the fault. Poutside is the probability of a servo being
positioned outside the flight envelope. Pinside is the probability of a
servo being positioned inside the flight envelope. The subsequent
level of the tree considers the contributions made by the FDI
algorithm. Any FDI algorithm has two pairs of states: missed
detection and true positive for q, and false alarm and true negative for
1 − q. The missed detection (MD) block under an in-range servo
failure can be further resolved depending on the robustness of the
nominal flight control law. These blocks are elaborated upon in
Sec. III.C. The hardware, flight envelope, and FDI algorithm levels
each have two states. Considering the further resolution of the MD
Table 1 Actuator architectures of Baldr: number of servos and
control surface coupling
Configuration
(minimum
number of servos) Ailerons Elevators Rudders Flaps Acronym
0 (4) Coupled Coupled Coupled Coupled CCCC
1 (4) Decoupled Coupled Coupled None DCCN
2 (4) Coupled Decoupled Coupled None CDCN
3 (3) Coupled Coupled Coupled None CCCN
4 (3) Decoupled Coupled None None DCNN
Fig. 3 Fault tree (MD: missed detection, TP: true positive, FA: false
alarm, TN: true negative).
**More information available online at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/
us/products/procerus/kestrel-autopilot.html [retrieved 14 October 2016].
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block, there are a total of nine states, making the fault tree pictured in
Fig. 3 a multistate reliability model.
The main distinction between traditional fault trees and the one
depicted in Fig. 3 is the type of levels considered. Although
traditional fault trees can also run several levels deep, they typically
capture only hardware failures, human errors, and software errors
[25]. Traditional fault trees, such as those that are applied to large
aircraft, are nevertheless complex because of the exhaustiveness of
the number and type of fault modes considered. Although this paper
does not exhaustively consider all possible fault modes, it does
introduce two new types of levels. In particular, the flight envelope
and FDI algorithm levels are different because they are not quantified
by the failure rate of any hardware component. Rather, the flight
envelope layer is governed by the aircraft flight dynamics, and the
FDI algorithm layer is governed by a tradeoff between false alarm and
missed detection rates. Hence, the proposed fault tree is, in principle,
less conservative than its traditional counterpart. The remainder of
this section gives the details of the analysis method, decomposed into
three steps: 1) determining the distribution of control surfaces,
2) flight envelope assessment, and 3) estimating the probability of
catastrophic failure.
A. Distribution of Control Surfaces
The first step in the analysis is determining the probability
distributions (histograms) of the control surfaces. These are
influenced by several factors, such as mission profile, flight control
law, and exogenous disturbances (sensor noise, wind gusts, and
turbulence). In this section, particular attention will be given to the
effect of themission profile on the probability distributions. There are
two methods to compute these histograms. The first is a direct
numerical method wherein the histograms are computed from flight
data or model-in-the-loop simulations. This method requires the
entire mission profile to be simulated or actually flown by the UAV.
This may not always be feasible because flying or simulating entire
mission profiles can be resource-intensive. In addition, in the early
design stages, a flight-ready UAV may be unavailable.
The second method is an indirect analytical method wherein the
mission profile is decomposed into M modes. If the control surface
distributions are known for these modes, the overall distributions can
be constructed by combining them with appropriate weights, as
shown in Eq. (1):
pΔiδi 
XM
j1
pΔiδijmode  jPmode  j (1)
Here, pΔiδi is the probability density function (PDF) of the
deflection of the ith control surface, denoted by the random variable
Δi, evaluated at a value of δi. Further, pΔiδijmode  j is the
conditional PDF of the ith control surface, conditioned on the event
that the aircraft is flying in mode j. The weight Pmode  j
associatedwith each conditional PDF is the probability of occurrence
of each mode for j  1; 2; : : : ;M. These probabilities are estimated
from the mission profile by computing the fraction of time spent in
each mode. Hence, pΔiδi can be computed for each
i  1; 2; : : : ; N, where N denotes the total number of control
surfaces. In this analytical approach, only a small library of PDFs
need to be predetermined to be able to generate PDFs for arbitrary
missions.
Small fixed-wing UAVs typically find application in aerial
photography and geographical surveying. An efficient mission
profile for aerial photography is the lawnmower pattern, an instance
of which is shown in Fig. 4. (This pattern is only used to aid the
exposition of the analysismethod; themethod itself is general enough
to be used with any profile.) When the entire mission is executed at
constant altitude, it can be decomposed into threemodes: straight and
level flight, and left and right banked turns. Altitude changes can be
captured by the additional modes of ascending and descending flight.
In the direct method, the entire mission is simulated using the model
of Baldr, with the baseline flight control law. In the indirect method,
the three modes can be independently simulated for a short duration.
Then, Eq. (1) can be applied to compute the PDF for the entire
mission. The probabilities of the modes can be calculated using the
knowledge of the airspeed of the aircraft and the geometry of the
flight path. In Fig. 4, the waypoints are 1000 and 200 m apart in the
north and east directions, respectively. Consequently, assuming that
the entire mission is flown at a constant trim airspeed, the probability
of being in a banked turn is 0.26 and of being in straight and level
flight is 0.74. There is a nonzero difference between the direct and
indirectmethods because the indirectmethod does not account for the
transients that occur between two different modes.
As an example, Fig. 5 shows the histograms of the deflections of the
ailerons, elevator, and rudder for the straight and level flight mode.
The horizontal axis shows the deflection in degrees, and the vertical
axis shows the occurrence. Similar distributions can be obtained for
the left and right banked turns but are not shown here. The analysis is
capable of handling arbitrary histograms. However, for illustrative
purposes, normal distributions are fitted to the histograms of the
aileron and elevator deflections. As mentioned previously, before a
fault occurs, the same nominal flight control law is used uniformly
across all five configurations listed in Table 1. Consequently, the
histograms only depend on the mission being executed and not on
the specific configuration. This assumption allows the reliabilities of
the different configurations tobe compared.Althoughonly onemission
profile is presented in this section, distributions for other mission
profiles can be obtained using either the direct or the indirect method.
Other parameters affecting these distributions include sensor
noise, atmospheric turbulence, and wind gusts. This highlights the
fact that reliability should not be treated as a static quantity that
depends only on aircraft parameters. The latter two parameters imply
that aircraft reliability is a dynamic quantity that is dependent on and
changes with the prevailing environmental conditions. Although this
paper investigates the impact of mission profile on the overall
reliability, similar studies can be conducted to investigate the impact
of sensor noise and turbulence. Another major parameter affecting
these distributions is the flight control law. As an example, the rudder
will have different distributions depending on whether the control
law is tuned for coordinated turns or yaw rate damping. More
generally, the gains of the control law affect the probability
distributions, which, in turn, affect the overall reliability. By properly
tuning the control law, the distributions can be tailored to meet
performance and reliability requirements. This will be investigated in
the future.
B. Flight Envelope Assessment
The second step in the analysis is assessing the flight envelope of
the aircraft. The aircraft equations of motion [20] can be described in
the nonlinear state-space form as shown in Eqs. (2) and (3):
_x  fx; u (2)
y  hx; u (3)
0 500 1000 1500 2000
−200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
East [m]
N
or
th
 [m
]
Aircraft path
Waypoints
Fig. 4 Aircraft path during area scanning mission.
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In these equations, x ∈ Rn is the state vector, u ∈ Rm is the input
vector, and y ∈ Rp is the output vector. n,m, andp are the number of
states, inputs, and outputs, respectively. In addition, f: Rn × Rm →
Rn is the state function, andh: Rn × Rm → Rp is the output function.
The state vector is x  ϕ; θ;ψ ; p; q; r; u; v; wT . Here, ϕ, θ, and ψ
are the Euler angles of the aircraft. The aircraft’s angular velocity in
the body-fixed frame are roll rate p, pitch rate q, and yaw rate r. The
airspeed components in the body-fixed axes are u, v, andw. We also
define a reduced-order state vector that does not contain ψ :
xr  ϕ; θ; p; q; r; u; v; wT . xr is used in the definitions of the flight
envelopes.
For configuration 0 (CCCC), there are only four unique
aerodynamic control inputs. In addition, the throttle is τ.
Consequently, the control input vector is u  τ; E; R; A; F. The
input vector will change depending on the actuator configuration.
The studies conducted in this paper make use of certain elements in
the output vector y. The airspeed, angle of attack, and angle of
sideslip are denoted by V, α, and β, respectively. The flight-path
climb angle and heading rate are denoted by γ and _ψ , respectively.
Aircraft typically fly around equilibrium or trim points. The
collection of all such trim points defines the steady flight envelope F
of the aircraft. In this paper, zero rate of change of xr is the basis for
defining the steady flight envelope, as shown in Eq. (4):
F 
n
 x; u:_xr  0; _u  0
o
(4)
where  x; u denotes an equilibrium point. A subset of the flight
envelope is steady, wings-level flight at constant altitude, described
mathematically as
Fstraight;level 
n
 x; u:f x; u  0; p  q  r  0; γ  0; _u  0
o
(5)
When the aircraft descends steadily, at a constant flight-path angle,
the envelope is described by Eq. (6):
Fsteady;descent 
n
 x; u:f x; u  0; p  q  r  0; γ < 0; _u  0
o
(6)
Steady banked turns at constant altitude are defined by constant
heading rate. For example, _ψ < 0 describes left banked turns, as
shown in Eq. (7):
Fbanked;left 
n
 x; u:_xr  0; _ψ < 0; γ  0; _u  0
o
(7)
Similarly, right banked turns are defined using _ψ > 0. These
subsets can be computed by applying numerical optimization
techniques to the nonlinear aircraft model [14].
The fidelity of the model plays an important role in the flight
envelope assessment. High-fidelity estimates of the aerodynamic
parameters of Baldr are available from extensive wind-tunnel tests
[21,26]. Such wind-tunnel tests are generally possible only for
aircraft that have reached an advanced stage of design and build.
However, small UAV designers may be interested in knowing the
reliability of their aircraft in the early design stage to make the right
decisions. In the early design stage, it is common to have estimates of
the linear aerodynamic stability and control derivatives. Hence, it is
imperative that the proposed reliability assessment method work
even when only low-fidelity aerodynamics are available. To
demonstrate this, the high-fidelity aerodynamics of Baldr are
downgraded to linear derivatives. Baldr’s nonlinear aerodynamics are
implemented as lookup tables that are parameterized on the flight
condition. A Taylor series expansion of these nonlinear functions
results in stability and control derivatives. As an example, a Taylor
series expansionof the coefficient of lift is shown inEq. (8),where the
trim values are denoted with an overline, ε denotes the linearization
error, and δi denotes the deflection of the ith control surface:
CLα; β; q; δ1; : : : ; δN  CL

α; β; q; δ1; : : : ; δN

 ∂CL
∂α

 x; u
α − α  ∂CL
∂β

 x; u
β − β  ∂CL
∂q

 x; u
q − q

XN
i1
∂CL
∂δi

 x; u

δi − δi

 ϵ (8)
To match the high-fidelity flight envelopes, all aerodynamic
parameters cannot be uniformly downgraded. The longitudinal
dynamics of aircraft are strongly affected by the angle of attack. In
particular, Fig. 6 shows the dependence of the coefficients of drag
CD, lift CL, and pitching moment Cm on α for Baldr. In this
figure, all other parameters are held constant at their respective trim
values.All three coefficients are reportedwith respect to the reference
point used during the wind-tunnel tests. In the early design stage,
potential flow-based computational tools are often used to estimate
linear stability and control derivatives. Potential flow, by its very
definition, does not account for viscous effects. However, it is the
viscosity in the flow that leads to the separation of the boundary layer
at high angles of attack. This boundary-layer separation is the reason
behind the nonlinear behavior that is seen at high angles of attack in
the plots ofCL vsα andCm vsα. The nonlinear behavior that is seen at
low angles of attack in CD vs α is due to the addition of profile drag
and induced drag [27].
However, it is possible to characterize the nonlinearities shown in
Fig. 6 evenwithoutwind-tunnel test data. The nonlinearity seen in the
CD vs α plot can be replicated using the drag polar, which is typically
a quadratic dependence ofCD onCL. The nonlinearity seen in theCL
vs α plot can be replicated with knowledge of the stall angle of attack
and peakCL of the aircraft. It is harder to estimate the nonlinearity in
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Fig. 5 Control surface distributions for straight and level flight with 400 bins.
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the Cm vs α plot. However, a conceptual aircraft design typically
includes the initial aerodynamic profile of the aircraft. Given an
aerodynamic profile, there is prior work demonstrating the
application of the principle of superposition to combine the results
from potential and viscous flow theories for this very purpose [28].
Based on the premise that the nonlinearities shown in Fig. 6 can be
estimated in the early design stage, a medium-fidelity aerodynamic
model of Baldr is created. In this medium-fidelity model, all
aerodynamic dependencies are linear, except for CD, CL, Cm vs α.
Thewind-tunnel-based nonlinear dependencies are retained for these
three coefficients in the medium-fidelity model. Next, this medium-
fidelity model is validated against the high-fidelity model by
comparing the equilibrium/trim points of the two models.
For illustrative purposes, a limited flight envelope assessment is
presented for configuration 0 (CCCC). Note that similar assessments
can be performed for the other configurations listed in Table 1 as well
but are not shown in this paper. The flight envelope of configuration 0
is presented mainly to develop intuition for the problem. The
envelope corresponding to longitudinal straight and level flight can
be used to determine the stuck ranges for the elevator and flaps. This
envelope is shown in theV − α plane in Fig. 7. Every point inside this
envelope is a trim point that has a different value of flap deflection.
There are several interesting observations. First, as expected, there is
an inverse relationship betweenV and α. Second, because a nonlinear
aircraft model is being trimmed, the flight envelope has well-defined
boundaries, as seen in Fig. 7.
The high-speed boundary is a collection of trim points that are
characterized by high airspeeds and low angles of attack. The high-
speed boundary is due to an upper limit on the thrust available. The
trim point corresponding to the highest achievable airspeed occurs at
a flap deflection of zero because neutral flaps correspond to the
minimum drag configuration. A trailing-edge down flap deflection,
while further decreasing the angle of attack, will increase the total
drag and, therefore, decrease the airspeed. At the stall boundary, the
stall angle of attack (15 deg) is reached at low airspeeds. The stall
boundary is due to a constraint on the output variable α. The trailing-
edge (TE) down/up flap boundary defines trim points for which flaps
are deflected to25 deg (trailing edge down/up). Note that, within
these boundaries, fixed flap deflections define isolines that follow the
general shape of the envelope. Although this envelope is plotted for
configuration 0, certain isolines define the envelopes for other
configurations. As an example, consider configuration 3 (CCCN),
where no flaps are used. The flight envelope for this configuration
would simply be the isoline for F  0 in Fig. 7.
Figure 8 shows the longitudinal flight envelope in the V − α plane
generated using the high- andmedium-fidelitymodels, shown by two
different patches. There is large overlap between the two models in
the middle of the flight envelope. On the contrary, there is reduced
overlap near the stall and high-speed boundaries of the envelope. This
reduced overlap is a natural consequence of model fidelity reduction.
Specifically, the medium-fidelity model does not capture certain
regions near the high-speed boundary. This is due to the inaccuracies
of modeling drag at low angles of attack using the linear control
derivative ∂CD∕∂δi. In addition, the medium-fidelity model
predicts the existence of trim points above the stall boundary
predicted by the high-fidelitymodel. This is due to the inaccuracies of
modeling lift and pitching moment at high angles of attack using the
linear control derivatives ∂CL∕∂δi and ∂Cm∕∂δi. The match
obtained between the two models in Fig. 8 is sufficient for the
remainder of the analysis, as will be shown in Sec. IV.
Figure 9 shows the flight envelope in the F − E plane along with
the variation of the angle of attack across trim points. Three
important conclusions can be drawn from this figure. First, it is seen
that trim points exist for the entire range of flap deflections, as
shown by the TE up/down flap boundaries. Second, there are no trim
points for a positively deflected elevator. This implies that, if the
elevator was to get stuck positively, the result would be catastrophic.
As an example, for configuration 3 (CCCN) (F  0), trim points
Fig. 7 Longitudinal flight envelope in the V − α plane. Fig. 8 Model validation using flight envelopes.
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Fig. 6 Nonlinear dependence of CD, CL, and Cm on α.
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exist for the elevator range [−25, −4 deg]. Finally, for any given
flap deflection, the high-speed boundary is reached when the elevator
is deflected to its highest trimmable value. Conversely, the stall
boundary is reached for the lowest trimmable value of the elevator.
Next, the flight envelope assessment is used to compute the
allowable limits on the stuck control surface deflections. A stuck
surface fault is called allowable if the aircraft can safely fly to a
landing site in the presence of this fault. To safely fly to a landing site,
the aircraft should be able to execute some limited maneuvers. The
aircraft should be able to fly straight and level, execute either left or
right banked turns with some minimum required turn rate _ψ , and
descend steadily at some minimum required flight-path angle γ,
irrespective of the airspeed. The minimum turn rate constraint
corresponds to a maximum turn radius. These limited maneuvers
form theminimal flight envelope in the γ − _ψ plane (Fig. 10). As long
as the actual flight envelope, in the presence of a stuck fault, is larger
than this minimal flight envelope, the aircraft can safely fly home.
Referring back to the lawnmower pattern introduced in Fig. 4, it is
seen that the turn radius encountered during such missions is on the
order of 100m. In addition, in many practical applications, UAVs are
required to stay within a geofence to ensure that they do not breach
terrestrial property limits. The virtual boundaries defined by the
geofence drive the performance and landing requirements for the
UAV. For this case study, the maximum required turning radius is set
as 87 m. This is sufficiently larger than the minimum achievable
turning radius of 54 m, while still being under the typical mission
radius of 100 m. At a nominal airspeed of V  20 m · s−1, an 87 m
turning radius corresponds to a heading rate of 13 deg ∕s and a
bank angle of 28 deg. The minimum required flight-path angle is
assumed to be γ  −3 deg because this is representative of typical
glide slopes. The four points shown in Fig. 10 define two triangles:
Fminimal;left and Fminimal;right. Furthermore, it is assumed that, if trim
points exist at the vertices of either of these two triangles, trim points
exist in all of the corresponding triangle.
For any given stuck fault, to safely fly home, at least one trim point
needs to be found in each of the subsets Fstraight;level and Fsteady;descent
and in either of the subsets Fbanked;left and Fbanked;right. In other words,
a stuck fault is called allowable if trim points can be found either in
Fminimal;left or Fminimal;right. In checking for the existence of trim
points, no explicit constraints (such as a zero sideslip angle
requirement) are placed on V, α, and β. The following steps describe
the calculation of the allowable stuck surface ranges. First, the
trimmable range for each surface is calculated at each of the four
points shown in Fig. 10. Then, the intersection of these trimmable
ranges is calculated betweenFstraight;level,Fsteady;descent, andFbanked;left.
This intersection is called the trimmable range for Fminimal;left. In a
similar way, Fminimal;right is calculated. The union of Fminimal;left and
Fminimal;right is defined as the allowable stuck surface range.
The allowable stuck surface ranges for configurations 1–4,
generated using the medium-fidelity model, are given in Table 2. The
coupling constraints imposed on each configuration are reflected in
Table 2. For example, configurations 1 and 4 have decoupled ailerons
that have a stuck surface range of25 deg. This is because the port
and starboard ailerons can each deflect independently of the other,
and a failure in either aileron can be compensated by the other. On the
other hand, configurations 2 and 3 have ailerons that are constrained
to deflect antisymmetrically and have a much narrower stuck aileron
range. Configuration 2 is the only configuration to have decoupled
elevators. Because faults in either elevator can be compensated
by the other, configuration 2 has a broad stuck elevator range of
[−25,16 deg]. On the other hand, configurations 1, 3, and 4 have
narrower stuck elevator ranges because all three of themhave coupled
elevators. Note that, for all configurations that have a rudder, stuck
faults in the full deflection range are allowable because rudder faults
simply induce a nonzero sideslip velocity.
There are small differences between the results listed inTable 2 and
those generated using the high-fidelity model, reported in [14].
Specifically, the elevator ranges for configuration 1 (DCCN) and
configuration 4 (DCNN) differ by 0.5 deg, configuration 3 (CCCN)
differs by 0.1 deg, and configuration 2 (CDCN) differs by 9 deg.
Although the difference in configuration 2 might appear excessive, it
does not matter in the computation of the probability of catastrophic
failure. This is because16 deg is sufficiently far out from the6σ
bounds straddling the mean of the elevator deflection (−4.2 deg in
Fig. 5). Values outside the 6σ bounds contribute negligibly to the
overall reliability. The only other differences in the allowable stuck
surface ranges are for the aileron deflections of configurations 2 and
3, both ofwhich have coupled ailerons. Specifically, the aileron range
for configuration 2 differs by 1 deg and configuration 3 differs by
2 deg. Once again, because these limits are outside the6σ bounds,
these differences do not contribute significantly to the overall
reliability. This will be investigated in more detail in Sec. IV.
C. Probability of Catastrophic Failure
The third (and final) step in the analysis is the computation of the
probability of catastrophic failure PSYS. As explained previously,
this step combines the results of Secs. III.A, and III.B. It is useful to
once again refer to the fault tree pictured in Fig. 3. Considering the
bottommost level of the fault tree, it is seen that there are nine
different events. The false alarm andmissed detection probabilities of
the actuator FDI algorithm are given by PFA and PMD, respectively.
Consider a servo that fails when the control surface is positioned
outside its allowable range. In this scenario, there is at least one point
Fig. 10 Minimal flight envelope.
Table 2 Allowable stuck surface ranges (medium fidelity)
Configuration Aileron(s), deg Elevator(s), deg Rudder(s), deg
1 (DCCN) [−25,25] [−25, −1.5] [−25,25]
2 (CDCN) [−11,11] [−25,16] [−25,25]
3 (CCCN) [−8,8] [−25, −4.1] [−25,25]
4 (DCNN) [−25,25] [−25, −1.5] N/A
Fig. 9 Longitudinal flight envelope in the F −E plane.
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in the minimal flight envelope (Fig. 10) where the aircraft cannot be
trimmed. Consequently, this analysis predicts catastrophic failure,
irrespective of the fault classificationmade by the FDI system i.e.MD
and true positive, or TP, both result in a catastrophic failure.
On the other hand, the FDI classification matters for a servo that
fails inside its allowable range. In particular, a true positive will lead
to a successful control law reconfiguration.On the other hand,missed
detections are acceptable only if the nominal flight control law is
robust to the servo fault (depicted by the S block). However, for
simplicity, this paper will assume that missed detections under an in
range servo failure will always lead to catastrophic failure (i.e., the N
block has probability equal to 1). Although this shortcoming affects
the accuracy of the results, it increases the conservativeness of the
approach. If no servos have failed, the FDI algorithm can have two
outcomes: false alarm (FA) or true negative (TN). If the control
surface is positioned outside its allowable range and the FDI
algorithm declares a false alarm, this event is assumed to lead to
catastrophic failure. On the other hand, if the control surface is
positioned inside its allowable range and no servo failures have
occurred, neither FA nor TN has any negative consequences.
One of the key assumptionsmade earlier was that the probability of
an actuator getting stuck within a certain deflection range is
proportional to the probability of the actuator being positionedwithin
that range. The probability of the ith surface being positioned outside
its allowable range is
Pout;i  1 −
Z
u
l
pΔiδi dδi
where l is the minimum value and u is the maximum value of the
corresponding allowable range. The complement is Pin;i 
1 − Pout;i. The probability of the ith surface getting stuck outside
the allowable range is qPout;i. The total probability of catastrophic
failure is
PSYS 
XN
i1
qPout;i  qPin;iPMD  1 − qPout;iPFA (9)
The first term in Eq. (9) results from the fact that both MD and TP
result in catastrophic failurewhen a control surface gets stuck outside
its allowable range. On the other hand, the second term in Eq. (9)
shows that only MD results in catastrophic failure when a control
surface gets stuck inside its allowable range. This is because the
controller can be reconfigured if the fault is detected properly. The
third term in Eq. (9) shows that false alarms lead to catastrophic
failure, but only outside the allowable range. It is reasoned that, upon
declaring a false alarm, the power supply to the servomay be shut off.
If this causes the servo to get stuck, a catastrophic failuremay result if
the control surface is outside its allowable range.
Another key assumptionmade in Sec. III was thatmultiple actuator
faults occur with negligible probabilities. This is a valid assumption
because q2 is several orders of magnitude smaller than PSYS, as
shown in Sec. IV. A more rigorous reliability analysis that considers
the interactions between multiple failure modes, but not the flight
envelope contributions, is given in [29].
IV. Reliability Analysis Results
A. Effects of Mean Time Between Failures and PMD
The analysis method described in Sec. III is applied to estimate
the overall reliabilities of the actuator architectures listed in Table 1.
The overall reliability depends on several different parameters: servo
MTBF, PMD, PMD, mission profile, trim point, model fidelity, etc. In
this section, the first set of results is presented by treating servoMTBF
and PMD as parameters. The entire lawnmower mission profile is
simulated with the medium-fidelity model at the nominal trim point.
Figure 11 shows the reliabilities as functions of the servo MTBF
with fixed values of PMD and PFA. The servo MTBF axis spans the
range from 500 to 8000 h. A typical example on the low-reliability
end is a Futaba hobby-grade servo [30]. A typical example on the
high-reliability end is a Littonmilitary-grade servo that is used on the
RQ-5 Hunter UAV [31]. In addition, there are examples that fall
within this range [15]. The values for the missed detection and false
alarm probabilities are taken from [22] and are set as PMD 
0.05 h−1 and PFA  0.01 h−1. Note that, although [22] pertains to
commercial passenger aircraft, it is a good starting point for this
analysis. In addition, PMD and PFA values are typically related
through a receiver operating characteristic. The probability of
catastrophic failure for configuration 3 is two orders of magnitude
greater than that of the other architectures. This is because
configuration 3 has no decoupled surfaces and has the least cross-
functionality in reconfiguration among all the configurations.
Configuration 1 is the second-worst architecture, despite having four
servos. Compared to configuration 3, configuration 1 has an extra
servo that decouples the ailerons and extends their allowable range to
[−25, 25 deg]. This greatly increases the reliability of
configuration 1 relative to configuration 3.
However, configuration 1 is uniformly less reliable than
configurations 2 and 4 over the displayed range of servo MTBF.
Note that the only way in which configuration 1 is different from
configuration 4 is the presence of a rudder. Despite the rudder,
configuration 1 (four servos) is less reliable than configuration 4
(three servos). This demonstrates that increasing the number of
servos does not necessarily increase the reliability. Whether the
addition of a servo increases or decreases the overall reliability
depends on the tradeoff between the two main contributions to the
terms in Eq. (9). First, in general, adding a control surface expands
the allowable flight envelope of the aircraft. This expansion in the
allowable flight envelope is reflected by an overall decrease in the
terms containing Pout;i. Second, adding a control surface increases
the overall probability of missed detections and false alarms because
additional fault modes are introduced. The addition of the rudder in
configuration 1 does not contribute to the flight envelope because the
rudder is not cross-functional with any of the other control surfaces.
However, the addition of the rudder in configuration 1 is detrimental
to its overall reliability because of the contribution of missed
detections and false alarms in Eq. (9). The main takeaway from this
observation is that, although adding a control surface might be
beneficial to the performance, it is not necessarily beneficial to the
overall reliability. Specifically, the overall reliability will improve
only if the benefits of cross-functionality are greater than the penalties
of missed detections and false alarms, quantified as explained
previously.
Finally, the two most reliable configurations are configurations
2 and 4. Excluding the rudder, both configurations 2 and 4 use a three-
servo architecture. Although configuration 2 has coupled ailerons
and decoupled elevators, configuration 4 has decoupled ailerons
and coupled elevators. The presence/absence of the rudder in
configurations 2 and 4 is the reason for the total number of servos
being different. However, Table 2 indicates that rudder faults of
any magnitude can be tolerated. Thus, the difference between
configurations 2 and 4 is primarily driven by the architecture of the
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Fig. 11 Reliability vs MTBF for lawnmower pattern for configura-
tions 1–4.
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elevators and ailerons. Figure 11 shows these two curves intersecting
at MTBF ≈930 h. For MTBF <930 h, the probability of catastrophic
failure is lower for configuration 4. This indicates that, for low-
quality servos, a configuration that decouples ailerons and couples
elevators is more reliable. On the other hand, for MTBF>930 h, the
probability of catastrophic failure is lower for configuration 2. This
indicates that, for high-quality servos, a configuration that couples
ailerons and decouples elevators is more reliable.
Asmentioned previously, the effect of dual actuator failures can be
ignored as long as q2 is several orders of magnitude smaller than
PSYS. Note that themaximum value of q is 10
−3 h−1 and corresponds
to theminimumMTBFof 1000 h.Hence, themaximumvalue ofq2 is
10−6∕h2. Comparing 10−6∕h2 to the range of values for PSYS plotted
in Fig. 11, it is seen the maximum value of q2 is two orders of
magnitude smaller than the smallest value of PSYS. Hence, it is
justifiable to neglect the contributions of dual actuator failures in the
current analysis.
Figure 12 shows the variation ofPSYS withPMD for fixed values of
MTBF and PFA. As before, configuration 3 is the least reliable, lies
outside the axis limits, and is not shown in the figure. Also note that
the only difference between configurations 1 and 4 is the presence/
absence of the rudder. Hence, in the limit PMD → 0, the penalty of
missed detections generated by the rudder in configuration 1 also
tends to zero. Given that rudder faults of any magnitude can be
tolerated (see Table 2), the reliabilities of configurations 1 and 4
converge as the missed detection rate approaches zero. From this
observation, one can conclude that, if a high-performance FDI
algorithm is available, a rudder can be added for better performance,
without significantly impacting the overall reliability. However, as
PMD increases, the reliabilities of configurations 1 and 4 start to
diverge, and the addition of the rudder introduces a greater cost on the
overall reliability. Over the entire range of PMD, configuration 2
uniformly does better than configurations 1 and 4. The relative
difference between the reliabilities of configuration 2 and
configurations 1 and 4 increases asPMD decreases (i.e., configuration
2 is an order of magnitude more reliable than configurations 1 and 4
forPMD < 0.005 h
−1). From this observation, one can conclude that,
if high-performance FDI algorithms are available, configurations
with coupled ailerons and decoupled elevators are more reliable than
the other configurations considered in this paper. As
PMD → 0.08 h−1, the reliability curves of configurations 2 and 4
intersect. This implies that, for FDI algorithms that have high rates of
missed detections, a configuration that has decoupled ailerons and
coupled elevators (configuration 4) eventually becomesmore reliable
than configuration 2.
The general conclusions on the different configurations, drawn
from Figs. 11 and 12, can be reasoned and validated using insights
from flight dynamics. First, from both figures, it is seen that
configuration 2 is the best performing, except near the low end of
servo MTBF and the high end of PMD. These observations highlight
the importance of decoupled elevators because configuration 2 is the
only configuration featuring two independently actuated elevators.
This makes sense from a flight dynamics perspective because the
elevators have the most control authority, owing to their large
moment arm relative to the center of gravity. Although the high
control authority of the elevators is useful when a different control
surface gets stuck, it is disadvantageous when the elevator itself gets
stuck. In particular, large deflections of other control surfaces are
required to compensate for small stuck faults in the elevators.
Therefore, by decoupling the elevators, two surfaces of comparable
control authorities are introduced. Consequently, stuck elevator
faults of larger magnitudes can be compensated for by the other
elevator. This also shows up as a larger range of [−25,16 deg] for
configuration 2 in Table 2. In contrast, all the other configurations
have coupled elevators and have smaller allowable stuck surface
ranges. In general, elevators are important not only for performance
but also for reliability.
For MTBF <930 h, the terms contributed by the elevators to the
probability of catastrophic failure exceed the terms contributed by the
ailerons. Consequently, a configuration that has decoupled elevators
(such as configuration 2) becomes less reliable than a configuration
that has decoupled ailerons (such as configuration 4). A similar
conclusion can be made as PMD increases beyond 0.08 h
−1. For
PMD > 0.08 h
−1, the terms contributed by the elevators to the
probability of catastrophic failure exceed the terms contributed by the
ailerons. Once again, configuration 2 becomes less reliable than
configuration 4. The plots shown in Fig. 11 are functions of several
variables, such as servo reliability, actuator placement, surface
coupling, mission, etc. In general, there is a complex interplay
between these different variables [32]. All the candidate architectures
considered in this case study are single-string designs. Thus, the
cross-functionality of the surfaces is amajor contributor to the overall
reliability of the UAVs. Increasing the cross-functionality between
surfaces can help increase the overall reliability with minimal
increases in size and weight.
Although Figs. 11 and 12 correspond to the medium-fidelity
model, similar figures can be created for the high-fidelity model. For
configurations 1, 3, and 4, the medium-fidelity model results in a
higher probability of catastrophic failure than the high-fidelity
model. This observation can bemeaningfully related to the allowable
stuck surface ranges listed in Table 2 and their high-fidelity
counterparts reported in [14]. From Table 2, the upper limits of the
allowable elevator deflection range for configurations 1, 3, and 4, are
−1.5, −4.1, and −1.5 deg, respectively. These limits are within the
3σ bounds straddling the elevator mean of −4.2 deg.
Consequently, even a 0.1 deg difference has a noticeable effect on
the overall reliabilities. For configuration 2, the only configuration
with split elevators, the reduction in fidelity has an insignificant
effect. Despite the differences between the high and medium-fidelity
models, the qualitative trends in the overall reliabilities are similar.
This is observedby comparing Figs. 11 and 12with their high-fidelity
counterparts [14].
B. Effects of Aircraft Operations
In Sec. III.A, the direct and indirect methods were discussed for
computing the PDF of the control surface deflections. The
differences between the two methods increase with servoMTBF and
are seen only in configurations 1 (DCCN), 3 (CCCN), and 4
(DCNN). For an MTBF of 7800 h, the differences for configurations
1, 3, and 4 are 12.8, 1.73, and 12.6%, respectively. For configuration
2 (CDCN), the only configuration with split elevators, the direct and
indirect methods yield the same results. The indirect method results
in lower probabilities of catastrophic failure than the direct method.
This is because the indirectmethod does not account for the transients
that arise when the aircraft transitions from one mode to another.
Specifically, the ailerons are active during the transients that arise
when the aircraft switches between straight and level and turning
flight. The extra aileron deflections during mode transitions are not
captured by the indirect method. Despite these differences, the
indirect method can be used in lieu of the direct method without
adversely affecting the overall trends. The effects of the transients
will be investigated in the future.
In this section, the effects of two aircraft operation parameters on
the overall reliability are investigated. The first parameter of
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Fig. 12 Reliability vs missed detection rate.
Article in Advance / VENKATARAMAN ETAL. 9
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
M
IN
N
ES
O
TA
 o
n 
N
ov
em
be
r 9
, 2
01
6 
| ht
tp:
//a
rc.
aia
a.o
rg 
| D
OI
: 1
0.2
514
/1.
C0
338
32 
investigation is the mission profile. As an example, a spiral ascent/
descent mission is considered as an alternative to the lawnmower
pattern. Spiral ascents/descents, wherein the aircraft is in a climbing/
descending turn, can be useful when altitude needs to be gained/lost
while staying within specified property limits. For the first 175 s of
this example, the aircraft is made to climb at a mean airspeed
of 23 m · s−1, a mean climb angle of 3.33 deg, and amean turn rate of
12.5 deg ∕s. For the next 175 s of this example, the aircraft is made to
descend, at the samemean airspeed and turn rate as before, but with a
mean climb angle of −3.33 deg. Figure 13 shows the resulting
overall reliabilities. As before, configuration 3 is the least reliable
configuration for all MTBF values. This is because it is the most
constrained configuration wherein all surfaces are coupled.
Interestingly, it is seen that configurations 1 and 4 are considerably
less reliable as compared to the lawnmower pattern of Fig. 11. This is
not surprising because configurations 1 and 4 have coupled elevators,
and the spiral mission excites more of the elevator as compared to the
lawnmower pattern.
The most reliable configuration, across all MTBF, is configuration
2 because it is the only configuration with decoupled elevators. With
the spiral ascent/descent commanding more of the elevator,
configuration 2 has the best overall reliability. No intersection
between configurations 2 and 4 is seen, unlike Fig. 11. However, an
intersection between configurations 1 and 4 is seen at an MTBF
≈3700 h. As mentioned previously, the only way in which
configuration 1 is different from configuration 4 is the presence of the
rudder. Although the rudder was detrimental to the overall reliability
in Fig. 11, Fig. 13 suggests that the rudder may be beneficial if high
reliability servos are available. Indeed, for servo MTBF >3700 h,
configuration 1 is more reliable than configuration 4 because the
rudder can help compensate for aileron faults by providing some
rolling moment. This is another example of cross-functionality
among the aerodynamic control surfaces. On the other hand, when
low reliability servos are present, the additional rudder is more of a
liability rather than an asset. Hence, for servo MTBF <3700 h,
configuration 4 is more reliable than configuration 1. Figure 13
highlights the fact that differentmission profiles can result in different
trends in the overall reliabilities. In choosing an actuator
configuration that results in the highest overall reliability, the
aircraft designer must consider the specific mission for which the
UAV is intended.
The second parameter that is investigated in this section is the trim
point of the aircraft for straight and level flight. Section III.B
described how trim points for straight and level flight could be
expressed as V; α pairs.Moreover, Fig. 7 showed that, whenF  0,
the flight envelope reduced to an isoline. Given that no configuration
among configurations 1–4 has flaps, the trim point is uniquely
defined by specifying either V or α. Figure 14 shows the variation of
the overall reliability (on the vertical axis) against the trim airspeed
(on the horizontal axis). The trim airspeed is sampled at 1 m · s−1
increments. The airspeed V  23 m·s−1 is marked with a vertical
dashed line and corresponds to the nominal trim point of Baldr. All of
the figures preceding Fig. 14 were plotted for this nominal trim
airspeed.
Figure 14 leads to several interesting observations. First, the
reliabilities of all four configurations increase with a decrease in the
trim airspeed. For this to make sense, consider the allowable stuck
elevator range column in Table 2. The lower elevator limit
corresponds to the highest achievable angle of attack and lowest
achievable airspeed. Conversely, the upper elevator limit corresponds
to the lowest achievable angle of attack and highest achievable
airspeed. For configurations 1 (DCCN), 3 (CCCN), and 4 (DCNN),
the upper limit is much closer to the elevator mean of −4.2 deg as
compared to the lower limit. This asymmetry is the primary reason
behind the first observation.As an example, consider configuration 3,
for which the upper elevator limit is −4.1 deg. By operating at the
nominal trim point, nearly half of the elevator histogram lies outside
the allowable range. This results in a high probability of catastrophic
failure. However, a decrease in the trim airspeed results in a decrease
in the trim elevator deflection. This “pulls” the mean of the histogram
more into the center of the allowable stuck elevator range. This results
in a smaller portion of the histogram to lie outside the allowable range
and results in a lower probability of catastrophic failure.
The second observation is that the reliabilities of some
configurations are more sensitive to the trim airspeed than others.
Configuration 3 is the most sensitive to the trim airspeed because
configuration 3 has the smallest stuck elevator range of [−25,
−4.1 deg]. Hence, the trim airspeed and trim elevator deflection have
a large impact on the overall reliability. On the other hand,
configuration 2 (CDCN) is the least sensitive because configuration 2
has the largest stuck elevator range of [−25, 16 deg]. The
sensitivities of configurations 1 and 4 to trim airspeed are of the same
order and are between those of configurations 2 and 3. Moreover, the
values of PSYS for configurations 1 and 4 start to converge with an
increase in the trim airspeed. This is because both configurations 1
and 4 share exactly the same allowable stuck elevator range, as given
in Table 2. On the other hand, at low trim airspeeds, PSYS for
configurations 1 and 2 converge. This once again shows that, when
the elevator is deflected sufficiently negatively, the reliability of
configuration 1 improves to the level of configuration 2. The same
nominal flight control lawwas used at all the trim airspeeds shown in
Fig. 14. This is not optimal because this flight control law was
designed specifically for the nominal trim airspeed. Nevertheless,
closed-loop stability was preserved at all trim airspeeds, with some
performance degradation at off-nominal trim airspeeds. Future work
will involve constructing a parameter-varying model of the aircraft
and synthesizing gain-scheduled or parameter-varying flight control
laws across the trim airspeeds.
V. Conclusions
This paper introduces a model-based framework for the reliability
assessment of actuator architectures for unmanned aircraft. The
proposed analysis method is described as a step-by-step process and
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is illustrated through a case study involving several candidate
actuator architectures. The actuator architectures differ in the number
of actuators and aerodynamic control surfaces present. Traditional
reliability analyses consider servo reliability as the primary
parameter affecting aircraft reliability, typically modeled as a binary
decision. This paper presents a fault tree that not only includes
actuator fault modes but also the constraints imposed by the aircraft’s
flight envelope and the performance of the fault detection algorithm.
In addition, this paper demonstrates the important parametric effects
of aircraft operations. Specifically, it is seen that different mission
profiles and trim points lead to different trends in the overall
reliabilities of the configurations. Hence, the most reliable actuator
architecture is dependent not only on the reliabilities of the onboard
components but also on aircraft operations. In all of these parametric
studies, the degree of cross-functionality present among the aircraft’s
aerodynamic control surfaces affects the overall reliability. Cross-
functional hardware redundancy provides a judiciousway to improve
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) reliability. To apply the analysis
method, it is sufficient to have a low-fidelity aircraft model. This
makes the proposed analysis method particularly attractive for
unmanned aircraft designers that want a reliability estimate in the
early stages of design.
There are several interesting avenues for future research, including
relaxing the assumptions made in this paper. One avenue involves
relaxing the assumption that the servo failure rate is time-invariant
and independent of the servomotor usage and position. In addition,
the servo failure rates are borrowed from the manufacturer-issued
product specification sheets. Bench-top experiments to validate the
numbers and figures of the servos will be investigated in the future.
Another avenue involves applying the key concepts introduced in this
paper for the reliability assessment of other aircraft subsystems.
Future work will also investigate how the design of the flight control
law and weather conditions, such as atmospheric turbulence, affect
the probability of catastrophic failure. This paper was limited in
scope to a specific fixed-wing airframe. A parametric study can be
constructed to investigate the effects of aircraft design parameters on
the overall reliability. Finally, a similar reliability assessment
framework may be constructed for multirotor UAVs.
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